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PRESENTISM, ETERNALISM,
AND THE TRIVIALITY PROBLEM
Abstract. It is often claimed that the debate between presentism and eter-
nalism is merely verbal, because when we use tensed, detensed or tenseless
notions of existence, there is no difference in the accepted metaphysical
statements between the adherents of both views. On the contrary, it is
shown in this paper that when we express their positions making use, in
accordance with intentions of the presentists and the eternalists, of the
tensed notion of existence (in the case of the presentists) and the detensed
or tenseless notion (in the case of the eternalists), the controversy remains
deep and very important for us, because both ontological claims express
a different attitude to the existence of the flow of time. It is shown that
not only does the proposed approach to presentism and eternalism exactly
express the intentions of the adherents of both views but it also offers a
better understanding of them joining together seemingly different theses
maintained by the presentists and the eternalists, and explaining at the
same time the dynamism of the presentists’ ontology. The paper takes for
granted that we should assess metaphysical theories in a similar way as we
assess scientific theories, that is on the basis of their explanatory value.
Keywords: presentism, eternalism, existence, flow of time, triviality problem
1. Introduction
The relation between existence and time seems to be one of the most
diﬃcult problems we face in metaphysics: the existence of the past, the
present, and the future; the ﬂow of time; the nature of persistence of
physical objects over time; and the way of timeless abstract objects exist
are still being discussed. In addition, these are far from being wholly
understood. The ﬁrst of these problems, which is the central topic of
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this article, seems to be especially far from being solved in spite of the
growing interest in it. Not only is it unresolved, it also looks as if we
do not understand what we are arguing about. When we examine the
main ontological theses of presentism and eternalism, saying that only
the present thing exists  in the ﬁrst case  or that the past, present,
and future things exist in the same way (ontologically on a par)  in the
second  it is easy to get suspicious that both these ontological theses are
trivially true or trivially false, according to how we understand the verb
“exist”: in the tensed or in the detensed (or tenseless) way.1 However,
the tensed and the detensed (or tenseless) notions of existence seem to
perfectly ﬁt the presentists’ and the eternalists’ views (respectively), and
this is why I would like to explore the strategy of resolving the triviality
problem not by resigning from these notions, but rather by reinterpreting
both views in such a way that they become contradictory. But ﬁrst, I
shall begin with recalling what the problem consists in. This problem
is often discussed as a threat to presentism only,2 but it is, in fact, the
threat to both competing views and I will discuss it as such.
2. What does “to exist” mean?
The controversy between presentism and eternalism will be real and not
obscure and merely verbal only if we are able to formulate both views
in such a way that i) Both views are truthfully presented. ii) They have
a clear sense. iii) They are in contradiction. To examine whether it
is possible to satisfy these conditions, let us start with a familiar way
of expressing both views. The presentists’ ontological thesis usually is
presented in the form:
(P) Only present things exist.3
1 See, for example, Merricks [1995, p. 523], Zimmerman [1998, pp. 208–210],
Sider [1999, pp. 325–327], Lombard [1999, pp. 254–255; 2009]; Crisp [2004]; Ludlow
[2004]; and Savitt [2004]. Because we are interested in the way of existence of the real
world in this debate, I will ignore the problem of timeless (or atemporal) existence of
abstract objects in my analysis. I will also pay no attention (except for one remark)
to the Growing Block Universe Theory, according to which the past and the present
are equally real [see Tooley 1997], since what is crucial to the triviality problem is
best seen in the debate between presentism and eternalism.
2 For example in Lombard [1999], Crisp [2004] and Ludlow [2004], the triviality
objection is only discussed as a threat to presentism.
3 See, for example, Merricks [1995, p. 523], Hinchliff [1996, p. 123], Zimmerman
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The eternalists’ thesis usually has one of the following two forms:
(E) Past, present, and future things exist.4
(E′) All times exist or are on an ontological par.5
The problem begins, as it is well known, when we start to consider what
the meaning of the verb “to exist” is (and other verbs like, for example,
“to be”, which are used in (E′)). If we assume the usual tensed meaning
from the natural language, then we have:
(P0) Only present things exist (in the tensed way).
(E0) Past, present, and future things exist (in the tensed way).
(E′0) All times exist (in a tensed way) or are (in the tensed way) on an
ontological par.
Now (P0) is trivially true and (E0/E
′
0) is obviously false for both the
presentists and eternalists. Thus, there is no real controversy and condi-
tion (iii) is not satisﬁed. Let us suppose the detensed meaning: x exists
(in the detensed way) ≡ x existed or x exists or x will exist6 Then, we
get:
(P1) Only present things exist (in the detensed way).
(E1) Past, present, and future things exist (in the detensed way).
(E′1) All times exist (in the detensed way).
Now (P1) is evidently false, (E1/E
′
1) is trivially true for both the presen-
tists and the eternalists and again condition (iii) is not satisﬁed. Nothing
changes if we, following Quine,7 take into account tenseless verbs in
which they are stripped of all temporal information; we can truly say
in this way, for example, that “The trial of Socrates takes place in 399
B.C.” or that “Socrates exists.” If we assume such tenseless meanings of
verbs, (P1) is obviously false, (E1) and (E
′
1) are trivially true for both
opponents, and condition (iii) is once again not satisﬁed.
[1998, p. 209], Sider [1999, p. 325; 2006, p. 75], Crisp [2004], Markosian [2004, p.47,
fn.1], and Lombard [2009, p. 3]. The possibility of defining presentism and eternalism
with the aid of “being real” will be examined later.
4 See, for example, Sider [1999, p. 326; 2006, p. 75] and Rea [2003, pp. 246–247].
5 See, for example, Lombard [2009, p. 3] and Merricks [1995, p. 524].
6 I call this meaning “detensed” (because it does not have past and future forms)
following Savitt [2004, p. 2]. Crisp [2004, p. 16] calls this meaning “disjunctive”.
7 “We can conveniently hold to the grammatical present as a form but treat it
as temporally neutral.” [Quine 1960, p. 170].
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Let us try another possibility of deﬁning both views, that can some-
times be found in the literature:
(P2) Only the present is real.
(E2) Past, present, and future things are equally real.
(E′2) All times are equally real.
8
The problem we are now faced with is again the copulas “is” and “are”
that are used in these sentences, and the ambiguity of “real.” As noted by
Austin and recalled by Savitt, “the function of ‘real’ is not to contribute
positively to the characterization of anything, but to exclude possible
ways of being not real  and these ways are both numerous for particular
kinds of things and liable to be quite diﬀerent for things of diﬀerent
kind.”9 Thus, if we, following Prior,10 ascribe unreality to the past and
the future, (P2) becomes trivially true and (E2/E
′
2) is obviously false for
both the eternalists and presentists, irrespective of which, the tensed, the
detensed, or the tenseless, meaning of “is” and “are” we assume. On the
other hand, if we try, for example, to determine “being real” in opposition
to “being imaginary” and assume the detensed or tenseless meaning of
“is” and “are” (in accordance with the intentions of the eternalists),
then (P2) becomes obviously false and (E2/E
′
2) trivially true for both
opponents. It can be added that omitting the copulas “is” and “are”
in (P2) and (E2/E
′
2) and saying simply about reality of the present or
reality of all times (respectively) changes nothing because the ambiguity
of “real” suﬃces to make both theses trivial. So, this way, we receive
again the violation of condition (iii).
There remained two possibilities  which are sometimes combined 
of making theses (P) and (E/E′) nontrivial: the ﬁrst makes use of the
notion of “the most unrestricted quantiﬁers” (or “the most inclusive”)
and the second has recourse to the notion of “existence simpliciter”.
Using the ﬁrst notion, we could express, for example, the ontological
theses of presentism and eternalism in the following way:
8 See, for example, Hinchliff [1996, pp. 122–123], Sider [1999, p. 325], Davidson
[2002, p. 77], Crisp [2003, p. 211], and Lombard [2009, p.3]. In the ontology of things,
we could say, for example, “Only present things are real” and “Things at all times are
equally real.”
9 Austin [1962, p. 70]. See also Savitt [2004, pp. 8–9].
10 “(. . . ) the present simply is the real considered in relation to two peculiar
species of unreality, namely the past and the future.” [Prior 1970, p. 245]
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(P3) The domain of our most unrestricted quantiﬁers only includes the
present objects.
(E3) The domain of our most unrestricted quantiﬁers includes the past,
present, and future objects.
(E′3) The domain of our most unrestricted quantiﬁers includes all tem-
poral objects.11
The diﬃculty we have with such a formulation, as was pointed out by
Savitt, is that “despite the widespread use of the notion of unrestricted
quantiﬁers in this literature, there is good reason for doubting its intel-
ligibility” [Savitt 2004, p. 8]. The problem is that while the notion of
restricted quantiﬁers has a precise meaning, it is hard to see how such
a precise meaning can be given to the notion of unrestricted quantiﬁers.
To be sure, similarly to the problem of “being real” pointed out earlier,
such a precise meaning can be given to the notion of quantiﬁcation if
we specify a contrast class of objects not belonging to the domain of
quantiﬁcation. However, if we do this by, for example, the condition
of being future or past, or by being purely imaginary, the problem of
triviality returns.
I tried to emphasize above  and this is exactly the point made by
Savitt  that unintelligibility of the notion of unrestricted quantiﬁers
should not be understood in the way that we cannot use them in precise
manner. The point is rather that when we do this, we must specify
the domain of quantiﬁcation and this means exactly speciﬁcation of the
domain of the objects about which we assume that they exist,12 which
immediately revives the triviality problem. To put it another way, be-
cause we quantify objects from some domain about which we assume
that they exist, this is the notion of existence that is primary for us.13
So, for example, historians and archeologists include past objects in the
12 “(. . . ) to what sense of ‘exist’ (Exist? EXIST?) is the existential quantifier
meant to (roughly) correspond?” [Savitt 2004, p. 10]. Savitt indicates the tensed
verbs by writing them in lower case, detensed verbs by capitalizing the first letter,
and the atemporal verbs by writing them entirely in capital letters.
13 Sider seems to be close to this idea when he claims: “There is a notion of
existence that is central to inquiry about the world. A claim is genuinely quantified iff
it is expressed by some sentence whose major connective is a syntactic quantifier that
means this notion of existence. Example: ‘There are electrons’.” [2006, p. 79] I could
add that if, for example, astronomers and biologists look for life on other planets,
then they do not look for objects that they can quantify over, but rather for objects
that exist.
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domain of their discourse, but when they do this, they perfectly know
that they say about objects that did exist but do not exist and this is
precisely why they are interested in these objects. The obvious conse-
quence of this is that before we quantify, we should decide which notion of
existence, detensed (tenseless) or tensed, we apply in the theses (P) and
(E/E′), and this way we come back to the beginning of our discussion: if
we do not specify the notion of existence, condition (ii) is not satisﬁed,
but if we choose one of these meanings of “existence”, this choice will
determine the logical values of (P) and (E/E′) for the presentists and
the eternalists  exactly in the same way as in the case of (P0), (P1),
(E0/E
′
0), and (E1/E
′
1), and thus the triviality problem revives.
One of the possible ways of overcoming this diﬃculty is to apply
a primitive notion of existence, common for both views. And indeed,
such a strategy using the notion of existence simpliciter is exploited, for
example, by Lewis [1986] and Sider [2006].14 But because the strategy
of making use of the notion of existence simpliciter is sometimes em-
ployed independently of the unrestricted quantiﬁers,15 I will analyze it
separately below.
Thus, it seems that by the notion of unrestricted quantiﬁers we can
easily satisfy, at least sometimes, conditions (i) and (ii) if we determine
the contrast class of objects not belonging to the domain of quantiﬁcation
or what is equivalent  the notion of existence which is exploited; but
then we cannot satisfy condition (iii). On the contrary, if we do not
specify the contrast class for “our most inclusive domain of quantiﬁca-
tion” and our notion of existence, we cannot satisfy condition (ii) and,
therefore should be suspicious about the possibility of fulﬁlling conditions
(i) and (iii).
I tried to show above that the discussion of the notion of existence
is inescapable for the solution of the triviality problem, and what kind
of troubles results from the application of the tensed, detensed, and
tenseless notions of existence. There remains, however, yet the above-
mentioned possibility of making use of the notion of existence common
14 According to Lewis, the unactualized possibilia exist simpliciter as well. The
second motivation for introducing the notion of existence simpliciter is that the adher-
ents of unbridled ontologies, like Lewis or Sider, find our everyday notion of existence
simply too modest for their purposes.
15 For example, Hestevold and Carter [2002, p. 499] make use of “existence
simpliciter” without the notion of the most inclusive quantifier in their explication of
the presentists’ view: “Necessary, if x exist simpliciter, then x presently exists.”
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for the adherents of both views, the notion of primitive, “genuine” exis-
tence  ”existence simpliciter”. Such a strategy, at ﬁrst sight, seems to be
the most promising for the prospect for the fulﬁllment of condition (iii).
Using this notion, we can express the ontological theses of presentism
and eternalism in the following way:
(P4) Only present things exist simpliciter.
(E4) Past, present, and future things exist simpliciter.
(E′4) All temporal objects exist simpliciter.
It could seem that now, at last, everything is in proper shape; condition
(iii) seems to be satisﬁed, presentists have an existence simpliciter just
of present things, whereas eternalists also of past and future things.
But is everything really OK? What could presentists say about (E4/E
′
4)
and eternalists about (P4)? I am afraid that the estimations would be
equally diﬃcult as in the case of Lewis’ claim that possible worlds exist
simpliciter, because we are not given an explanation of what “to exist
simpliciter” means and all the three theses are simply obscure.16 Let us
take as an example the sentence:
(D) There exist simpliciter dinosaurs.
An eternalist will, of course, accept such a sentence but what about a
presentist? Sider claims that the presentist will deny (D),17 but whether
she really will? First of all, she will maintain that the eternalist who
accepts such a sentence is probably using the notion of existence sim-
pliciter differently than her, because although this notion is obscure, one
thing is sure for her: whenever the eternalist utters or could utter (D),
its logical value does not change for the uttering person in time, and
this means that the notion of the existence simpliciter in the eternalist’s
usage is devoid of future and past forms, and is detensed (or tenseless).
In consequence, she will claim that because she accepted (E1) and (E
′
1)
with detensed (or tenseless) meanings of “existence”, she cannot deny
(D) in a responsible way if she has to ascribe the same meaning to the
notion of existence simpliciter as the eternalist does. If she wants to
fulﬁll condition (i), she could only deny (D) with the tensed notion of
16 I would join here the appeal of Savitt [2004, p. 12] to those who say about
existence simpliciter of unicorns or dinosaurs for an explanation of what they are
talking about.
17 “Well, ‘exist’ could mean exists. Eternalists think that dinosaurs exist  exist
simpliciter. Presentists disagree.” [Sider 2006, p. 76]
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existence simpliciter, but in this case she denies, in fact, a diﬀerent state-
ment (because of the diﬀerent meaning of the notion of existence) than
the eternalist. So, it seems that with the notion of existence simpliciter
we cannot satisfy condition (iii) as well.
Is it at all possible to satisfy all three conditions? I would like to
explore such a possibility. It seems to be diﬃcult to satisfy condition (i)
and (ii) with the notions of “the most unrestricted quantiﬁer” and “exist
simpliciter”, as I tried to show earlier, and this is why I am inclined to
return to the notions of existence which are clear, familiar, and most
preferable for adherents of both views; to the well known from natural
language tensed notion of existence (in the case of the presentists) and to
the detensed or tenseless notion of existence (in the case of the eternal-
ists). Thus, we get (P0)  with the tensed meaning of “exist”  as the
thesis of the presentists and (E1/E
′
1)  with the detensed or tenseless
meaning of “exist”  for the eternalists. Conditions (i) and (ii) are now
satisﬁed, but condition (iii) does not seem to be fulﬁlled again. But does
such a resolution really trivialize the debate on presentism-eternalism as
merely verbal, as suggested, for example, by Lombard [2009], or does
this make both views not contradictory, but complementary, which, in
turn, is proposed by Savitt [2004]?18 I maintain that not at all, and to
show this, let us begin with the thesis (P0) of the presentists. What
does it really mean if somebody claims “only present things exist (in
the tensed way)”? It means, ﬁrst of all, that they accept the tensed
notion of existence, which makes it possible to say that some entities
exist although they did not exist, some other existed but no longer exist,
and yet another will exist although they do not exist. However, such
a claim is only possible if somebody accepts the objectivity (or mind-
independence) of the ﬂow of time, and this means that when a presentist
states (P0), they, as a matter of fact, maintain the conjunction of (P0)
and the second thesis, speaking about existence of the (objective) ﬂow
of time:
(FT) The ﬂow of time exists.19
18 Savitt [2004, pp. 13–18] puts forward something like a doctrine of two truths.
According to this proposal, eternalism and presentism provide us with two different
perspectives: external  having the resources needed to tackle the (external) question
as to the structure of space-time itself  and internal making it possible to explain
our experience of time. I prefer to believe, however, that truth is only one.
19 The presentist accepts (FT) with the tensed meaning of “exist”.
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and it is, in fact, the conjunction of (P0) and (FT), and not (P0) alone,
that should be discussed as the ontological view of the presentists, and
which should be accepted or rejected as a whole. Such a formulation
of the presentists’ position makes use only of tensed verbs, has a clear
sense, remains in agreement with the intentions of the presentists, and
therefore it cannot be accepted by the eternalists; thus, it satisﬁes all
three posited conditions (i–iii).
To explain the status of (P0) and some notions used in (P0) and
(FT), I would like to remind here that the presentists make use of the
tensed notion of existence to introduce (or explain) the notion of the
present. Here I recall some examples:
Before directly discussing the notion of the present, I want to discuss
the notion of the real. These two concepts are closely connected; indeed
on my view they are one and the same concept, and the present simply
is the real considered in relation to two peculiar species of unreality,
namely the past and the future. [Prior 1970, p. 245]
[. . . ] the presentness of an event is just the event. The presentness of
my lecturing, for instance, is just my lecturing. [Prior 1970, p. 247]
To be present is simply to be, to exist, and to be present at a given
time is just to exist at that time no less and no more.
[Christensen 1993, p. 168]
On a presentist ontology, to exist temporally is to be present. Since
presentness is identical with temporal existence (or occurrence) and ex-
istence is not a property, neither is presentness a property. Presentness
is the act of temporal being. [Craig 1997, p. 37]
In a similar way, the presentists (and, in fact, we all) understand the past
as something that existed and the future as something that will exist.
This could indeed suggest that the ontological thesis (P0) of the presen-
tists is trivially true due to the meanings of the words used in it, and that
there is no real controversy between the presentists and the eternalists.
However, I tried to show that this objection is not justiﬁed. The point
is that presentists’ metaphysical theses (P0) and (FT) nicely ﬁt to what
Quine and others wrote about holistic conﬁrmation of our theories20:
the meaning of (P0) and of the terms “present” and “exist” used in it
depends strongly on acceptance (or rejection) of (FT). The acceptance
of (FT) means the acceptance of the fact that the tensed structure of
our language (and especially of the notions of existence and the present)
20 See e.g. Duhem [1906]; Quine [1961].
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reﬂects the real structure of the world, while its rejection means that we
should treat the tensed notions of existence and the present as notions
corresponding to our subjective knowledge only. In the case of the pre-
sentists, this means that the assumed notion of existence used in (P0) 
the tensed notion of existence  is a consequence of the acceptance of
(FT), and it makes no sense to assess (P0) without (FT). To repeat the
main point once again: this is the conjunction of (P0) and (FT) which
should be accepted or rejected as a whole.
As regards the notion of the ﬂow of time referred to in (FT), I would
like to remind shortly that although there are still raised objections to
presentism concerning an allegedly unexplained nature of the ﬂow of
time, we have the remarkable Broad’s idea of the ﬂow of time as absolute
becoming, that describes the passage of time as coming into being or
simply as a successive happening of events21:
To “become present” is, in fact, just to “become”, in an absolute sense;
i.e., to “come to pass” in the Biblical phraseology, or, most simply,
to “happen”. Sentences like “This water became hot” or “This noise
became louder” record facts of qualitative change. Sentences like “This
event became present” record facts of absolute becoming.
Broad [1938, pp. 280–281]
Such an approach to the ﬂow of time does not invoke the idea of moving
now and does not demand the second dimension of time to explain the
dynamical character of it. And what is important here, there is no
reason to deny the primitiveness of Broad’s absolute becoming: Broad
understands it as happening or coming into existence of events and it
seems that there is no more primitive concept for us than the notion of
existence or coming into existence.
If we apply the notion of becoming of events as their coming into
existence and Prior’s (inter alia) idea of the present as totality of what
tensedly exists, we can alternatively transform the presentists’ position
into the form:
(FT′ +P0) Events that we call present become or come into existence.
Alternatively, we can, following Sellars, who claimed that “only things
can become in the sense of come into being” [1962, p. 556], ascribe be-
21 Broad’s notion of absolute becoming was revived and supported by Savitt in
his papers, e.g. [1996, 2001].
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coming to things and express the metaphysical position of the presentists
in the following way:
(FT′′ +P0) Things that we call present become or dynamically exist.
In both cases (FT′+P0) and (FT
′′+P0), verbs are used in the tensed way.
I added in the last sentence that things dynamically exist to emphasize
the signiﬁcant diﬀerence between becoming of events and becoming of
things: the former come to pass, the latter do not cease to be but persist
by enduring, that is by being wholly present at each time at which they
exist.22 The dynamical (and tensed) existence is here used in opposition
to the static (and detensed or tenseless) existence exploited by eternal-
ists. The relation between (FT′+P0) and (FT
′′+P0) is quite simple: we
can treat events as consisting in acquiring, losing or changing properties
by things. Both these formulations of the presentism ((FT′ + P0) and
(FT′′ + P0)) make this doctrine and the idea of the ﬂow of time more
precise than the conjunction (FT) & (P0) and  like this conjunction 
cannot be accepted by the eternalists.
What is also essential for the proposed approach to presentism is
that all three formulations of the presentists’ ontological position ((FT)
& (P0), (FT
′+P0), (FT
′′+P0)) emphasize the dynamic character of this
view, which is lacking in the case of (Pi, for all i); in the traditional for-
mulation of the presentists’ ontological thesis “Only the present exists”,
the present has a static character. Thanks to the dynamic character of
the proposed interpretation of presentism, its adherents can easily defend
it against attack such as that of Lewis’ [1986]:
Consider the philosophers who say that the future is unreal. If ever
anyone is right that there is no future, then that very moment is his last,
and what’s more is the end of everything. Yet when these philosophers
teach that there is no more time to come, they show no trace of terror
or despair! Lewis [1986, p. 207]
Due to the dynamic character of becoming and existence, what exists,
that is the present, is continually changing, and future will come, so
there is no reason to despair for the presentists.
Another very important merit of the presented approach to the meta-
physical theory of presentism is that due to it, both theses (FT) and (P0),
which presentism consists of, are no longer only loosely related: they
22 The idea of the flow of time as dynamical existence of all things (and other ob-
jects which our world consists of, as, for example, space) is developed in Gołosz [2011].
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form, as a matter of fact, one homogeneous metaphysical doctrine. This
is the acceptance of the ﬂow of time, understood as dynamical existence
of things or coming into existence of events, which constitutes the core
of the ontological position of the presentist.
To sum up the above reﬂections concerning the metaphysics of pre-
sentism, what I claim is that it is not the single (Pi) with i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
but rather the conjunction of (P0) and (FT), or (FT
′+P0), or (FT
′′+P0)
considered as a whole that expresses the ontological view of the presen-
tists, and always when they say something like (P) they, in fact, mean the
conjunction of (P0) and (FT), or (FT
′+P0), or (FT
′′+P0). These formu-
lations make use only of tensed verbs, have a clear sense, remain in agree-
ment with the intentions of presentists, and therefore they cannot be
accepted by the eternalists; thus, they satisfy all three conditions (i–iii).
And what with the eternalists? Well, they, of course, do not agree
to existence of the ﬂow of time and the objectivity of the distinction
between the past, the present, and the future for a number of reasons,
both physical and philosophical. Namely, according to the eternalists,
there are some serious problems presentism faces:
1. There is no ﬂow of time in physics.
2. There are some diﬃculties with metaphysical explanations of what
the ﬂow of time is.23
3. The tensed notion of existence is questionable because:
a) according to the special theory of relativity, the relation of simul-
taneity (and, consequently, the present) is relative;24 and
b) it is not clear which propositions about the nonpresent objects are
referred to.25
As a result, the eternalists do not accept the tensed notion of exis-
tence, which we use in the natural language.26 Instead, they introduce
23 There is, for example, persistently repeated objection “How fast does time
flow?” [e.g. Price 1996, p.13].
24 See e.g. Davies [2002], who denies the possibility of reconciliation the idea
of objective flow of time with the theory of relativity, and Dorato [2004] and Gołosz
[2011], who take an opposite route.
25 See e.g. Markosian [2004] and Gołosz [2011] for an analysis of the problem
and some trials of a defence of the presentism.
26 They can only accept pragmatical usefulness of the tensed language for us
agents that act on our beliefs about what is happening now [see, for example, Mellor
1981, pp. 73–88; 1998, pp. 3–4, 58–62, 64–66].
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the detensed or the tenseless notion of existence, and use sentences like
(E1) and (E
′
1) to introduce (or explain) this special notion of existence 
these sentences are basic assumptions and a kind of metaphysical axioms
of eternalism. Furthermore, it seems that the eternalists should prefer
(E′1) to (E1) because this ﬁrst sentence does not introduce the notions
“past”, “present”, and “future”, which are metaphysically suspicious for
them. We should remember, however, that (E1) (or (E
′
1)) does not ex-
press the whole view of the eternalists, because in this way they only
introduce their notion of existence that is assumed to justify metaphysi-
cally their conviction about the subjectivity (ormind-dependence  to use
Grünbaum’s words) of the ﬂow of time and  what is the consequence 
about subjectivity of the distinction between the past, the present, and
the future. Thus, the theses (E1) and (E
′
1) should be completed by the
second thesis speaking that the objective ﬂow of time does not exist:
(SFT) There is no objective ﬂow of time.27
In consequence, this is the conjunction of (SFT) and (E1/E
′
1), with
the detensed or tenseless verbs in them, which expresses the ontologi-
cal position of the eternalist,28 and it should be accepted (or rejected)
together as a whole, exactly as in the case of presentism. And because
(SFT) is rejected by the presentists, the ontological theses of the eternal-
ists are not trivially true. Thus the conjunction of (SFT) and (E1/E
′
1)
remains in agreement with the intentions of the eternalists, has a clear
sense and cannot be accepted by the presentists, so it satisﬁes all three
posited conditions (i–iii). It should be also added that, as in the case
of presentism, due to the introduced strict bond between (SFT) and
27 Some examples of such eternalists’ theses: “Therefore it appears that that flow
of time is subjective, not objective.”[Davies 2002, p. 47]; “In the form of tensed belief,
it is the psychological reality behind the myth of tense, the myth of the flow of time.”
[Mellor 1981, p. 116]; “From now on I shall simply take for granted the main tenets
of the block universe view. In particular, I’ll assume that the present has no special
objective status, instead being perspectival in the way that the notion of here is. And
I’ll take it for granted that there is no objective flow of time.” [Price 1996, p. 15]; “One
can easily get the idea that the notions of past, present and future apply objectively
to the universe. In contrast, I shall argue that the concepts of past, present and the
future have significance relative only to human thought and utterance and do not
apply to the universe as such” [Smart 1963, p. 132].
28 Such a formulation of eternalism resembles the doctrine of Static Time of
Hestevold and Carter [1994, p. 270].
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(E1/E
′
1), the proposed approach to eternalism makes this metaphysical
theory a homogeneous metaphysical doctrine.
This way, the debate between the presentists and the eternalists be-
comes a controversy between the positions regarding two inseparable
problems, which must be tackled together: whether the ﬂow of time
exists and which notion of existence  tensed or rather detensed (tense-
less)  is metaphysically justiﬁed. Such a controversy can be estimated
on the basis of how the competing metaphysical theories can explain
our everyday experience with its fundamental phenomenon of ﬂow of
time, whether they can be harmonized with science, and which notion
of existence is acceptable metaphysically because it is able, inter alia, to
help us to understand the problem of persistence of things over time and
to resolve the problem of change. They can stand these tests for better
or for worse  that remains to be seen  but the problem of whether time
really passes and what really exists, which they try to resolve, is by no
means trivial. On the contrary, the controversy between presentism and
eternalism, seen as such, is very deep and serious, and equally important
for us as the debate on whether the world really exists or rather it is
merely a subjective illusion.
I am not going to analyze the Growing Block Universe Theory in this
study, and what I would only like to do is notice that, from the point of
view presented in this analysis, this is a position that is especially diﬃcult
to vindicate. The reasons for this are quite simple: it assumes objectivity
of the ﬂow of time and the speciﬁc notion of existence in which the past
exists in the same way as the present, and this way it inherits diﬃculties
of both presentism and eternalism. Therefore adherents of this view
should explain to us  exactly as the presentists should do what the
ﬂow of time really consists in; how we can harmonize it with science;
and  as the eternalists  are obliged to explain why they assume that
the past exists and what it really means.
3. Final remarks
It was not my aim to solve the controversy between presentism and eter-
nalism, but rather to show what it is really about. I tried to show that
it concerns the fundamental metaphysical problem of whether the ﬂow
of time exists, and what we should assume as existing. Both discussed
positions are founded on diﬀerent notions of existence  tensed, in the
ﬁrst case, and detensed or tenseless, in the second  and we can estimate
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them by examining whether they can be harmonized with science and
which notion of existence is acceptable metaphysically.
I tried to show that the controversy seen as such is a real contro-
versy; if we understand both ontological position in the proposed way,
both views will be truthfully presented, will have a clear sense, and
will be in contradiction. I also emphasized that such a formulation of
both views has two other merits: ﬁrstly, both views become homogenous
metaphysical doctrines which cannot be split into two separated theses,
and secondly, it explains why the present, as it is seen by the presentists,
is continually and dynamically changing. This way the proposed solution
of the triviality problem gives us something more than a solution of a
single metaphysical problem it also gives us a deeper insight in the on-
tological controversy between the presentists and eternalists explaining
to us why the adherents of both view join together two allegedly diﬀer-
ent theses and why the presentists can treat the present as dynamically
changing. And if we believe in the old methodological principle saying
that the better a theory is, the more problems it explains, we should
accept such a solution.
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